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Equal Civil Partnerships, Discrimination and the Indulgence of Time:  
R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for 
International Development 
 
*Andy Hayward  
 
In R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International 
Development the Supreme Court unanimously declared that the ban on different-sex civil 
partnerships was incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. In a strikingly robust and, at times, acerbic manner, the Court systematically 
dismantled the Secretary of State’s request for tolerance of a discriminatory and unsustainable 
legal position. The decision represents a clear victory for those campaigning for reform and 
the issuing of a declaration of incompatibility by the Court is likely to have influenced the later 
announcement by Prime Minister Theresa May in October 2018 that different-sex civil 
partnerships will ultimately be introduced in England and Wales. 
 
Keywords: Civil Partnerships – Marriage – European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, Articles 8 and 14 – Human Rights Act 1998 
 








Civil partnerships, introduced in December 2005, were conceptualised as an ‘important 
equality measure’ offering largely comparable legal protections to same-sex couples at a time 
when granting access to marriage was not politically viable.1 With societal attitudes changing, 
and again premised on the promotion of equality, the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 
subsequently granted same-sex couples the ability to enter civil, and in some circumstances, 
religious marriages.2 However, following the introduction of same-sex marriage in March 
2014, Parliament had created a glaring inequality through its failure to simultaneously phase 
out or, alternatively, extend the coverage of the civil partnership regime to different-sex 
couples. Whilst labels and legal distinctions between the two institutions can be debated, it is 
indisputable that from that point in time onwards same-sex couples had access to two formal 
relationship statuses, whereas different-sex couples were limited to one.  
 
The ensuing inequality created and its compatibility with the United Kingdom’s obligations 
under the European Convention on Human Rights were issues that had long been highlighted 
by academics.3 With a view to extending the civil partnership regime to different-sex couples, 
                                                     
* Durham Law School, Durham University. The author would like to thank Helen Fenwick, Benedict Douglas 
and the anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. All errors and opinions remain his 
own. 
1 Department of Trade and Industry, Civil Partnership: A Framework for the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex 
Couples (London: 2003) 13. 
2 See H. Fenwick and A. Hayward, ‘From Same-Sex Marriage to Equal Civil Partnerships: On a Path towards 
‘Perfecting’ Equality?’ [2018] 30(2) CFLQ 97, 104-105. 
3 See N. Barker, ‘Civil Partnerships: An Alternative to Marriage? An Analysis of the Application in Ferguson and 
Others v United Kingdom’ [2012] 42 Family Law 499 and N. Barker and D. Monk, From Civil Partnership to 
Same-Sex Marriage: Interdisciplinary Reflections (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015). 
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amendments were tabled to the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill,4 public consultations 
initiated5 and Private Members’ Bills introduced into both Houses of Parliament.6 More 
importantly for this note, this issue was also challenged judicially, most recently by the Equal 
Civil Partnerships campaign. In June 2018 and after almost four years of litigation, the Supreme 
Court unanimously declared in R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of 
State for International Development that the current ban on different-sex civil partnerships, 
contained within sections 1 and 3 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, was incompatible with 
Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.7  
 
Despite claims in the media to the contrary, the litigants remain unable to register a civil 
partnership. It is well understood that a declaration issued under section 4 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 merely acts as a formal record of incompatibility and has been deemed ‘little more 
than a cry for action’.8 Formally speaking, a declaration of incompatibility does not oblige 
either the government or Parliament to act. However, it should be noted that declarations are 
also not normally ignored and the fact that incompatibility was found is likely to have 
galvanised support for the recently enacted Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths 
(Registration etc) Act 2019 that compels the Secretary of State to amend the Civil Partnership 
                                                     
4 See the proposed amendment, Clause 10, introduced on 20 May 2013 and tabled by Tim Loughton MP: HC Deb 
vol 563 col 990 20 May 2013.  
5 See Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales): A Consultation 
(London: 2014) and the earlier Government Equalities Office, Equal Civil Marriage: A Consultation (London: 
2012). 
6 See the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (Amendment) Bill [HC] 2016–17 and a modified later version, the Civil 
Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration Etc.) Bill [HC] 2017–19, both introduced by Tim Loughton MP. 
See also the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (Amendment) (Mixed Sex Couples) Bill [HL] 2017-2019 introduced by 
Baroness Burt in the House of Lords. 
7 [2018] UKSC 32. See A. Hayward, ‘Taking the Time to Discriminate - R (on the application of Steinfeld and 
Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development’ [2019] 41(1) JSWFL 92. 
8 C. Gearty, ‘Revisiting Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 551, 552.  
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Act 2004, by way of regulations, so as to permit different-sex civil partnerships.9 The purpose 
of this note is to situate the Supreme Court decision within this broader landscape of law reform 
and, after detailing the proceedings to date, it will analyse three key issues: the use of public 
consultations; the issuing of a declaration of incompatibility, and the impact of this case on 
civil partnership reform.  
 
A - Background to the Supreme Court decision 
 
B - Facts and previous decisions 
 
Steinfeld and Keidan are a different-sex couple with two children. They wish to enter a civil 
partnership owing to a genuinely held ideological opposition to marriage, which they perceive 
to be an out-dated and patriarchal institution.10 The couple were refused the ability to register 
a civil partnership in 2014 on the basis that they were not ‘of the same sex’.11 The couple 
unsuccessfully challenged that refusal in the High Court where Andrews J determined that their 
claim did not fall within the ambit of Article 8, and even had it done so that such difference in 
treatment could be objectively justified. Put simply, Andrews J believed that as civil marriage 
                                                     
9 See H. Fenwick, Fenwick on Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Abingdon: Routledge, 5th ed, 2017) 173 to the 
effect that Members of Parliament ‘perceive their role as being to modify legislation’ to comply with declarations. 
See also Ministry of Justice, Responding to Human Rights judgments: Report to the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights on the Government’s response to Human Rights judgments 2017–2018, Cm 9728, November 2018 50 
acknowledging the Government’s response to the Supreme Court decision. 
10 For further analysis see: L. Ferguson, ‘The curious case of civil partnership: the extension of marriage to same-
sex couples and the status-altering consequences of a wait-and-see approach’ [2016] 28 CFLQ 347, R. Wintemute, 
‘Civil partnership and discrimination in R (Steinfeld) v Secretary of State for Education’ [2016] 28 CFLQ 365 
and C. Draghici, ‘Equal marriage, unequal civil partnership: a bizarre case of discrimination in Europe’ [2017] 
CFLQ 313. 
11 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s 3(1)(a). 
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was available to them the ‘only obstacle’ to the couple obtaining recognition of their 
relationship equivalent to that of a same-sex couple was their ‘conscience’.12 The Court of 
Appeal accepted that their claim did fall within the ambit of Article 8 and unanimously 
dismissed what was termed the ‘can-marry’ argument on the basis that marriage was not an 
‘effective option’ for the litigants.13 Nevertheless, whilst all of the judges accepted that their 
inability to access a civil partnership constituted discrimination, a 2:1 majority considered that 
the need for the government to conduct further research into this area rendered such difference 
in treatment justifiable. This view, however, was time-sensitive; without providing a deadline 
by which the research had to be concluded, Briggs LJ remarked that it would gradually become 
‘increasingly difficult’ for the government to justify a ‘wait and see’ position in the future.14 
 
B - Ambit of Article 8 
 
In the Supreme Court, Lord Kerr, with whom all the other justices agreed, gave the sole 
judgment. On ambit, it was accepted by counsel for the government that the claim did fall 
within Article 8 (despite Andrews J’s contrary belief in the High Court) and thus there was 
little discussion of this point. Had this point been disputed, the readiness with which the Court 
of Appeal determined the engagement of Article 8, coupled with a similar approach taken by 
the Strasbourg court in Ratzenböck and Seydl v Austria, would have made it highly likely that 
the Supreme Court would have reached the same decision.15 One helpful contribution, 
                                                     
12 R (Steinfeld) v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 128 at [39]. 
13 Steinfeld and Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81 at [40] (Arden LJ). 
14 ibid at [162]. 
15 [2017] ECHR 947. See H. Fenwick and A. Hayward, ‘Equal Civil Partnerships and the Implications for 
Steinfeld and Keidan: Ratzenböck and Seydl v Austria’, UK Human Rights Law Blog, 21 November 2017 at 
https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2017/11/21/equal-civil-partnerships-implications-of-strasbourgs-latest-ruling-
for-steinfeld-and-keidan-helen-fenwick-andy-hayward/ (last accessed 3 May 2019).  
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however, was rectification of an earlier erroneous view, stemming from M v Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions, that an adverse effect in relation to Article 8 was required before an 
infringement could fall within its ambit.16 Determining that no detrimental effect needed to be 
established, the Supreme Court brought the domestic position into line with that present at 
Strasbourg and, more importantly, emphasised the centrality of human rights in this context.17 
 
A - Justification 
 
Having established the applicability of Article 8 and that the difference in treatment was based 
on sexual orientation, thereby engaging Article 14, the Supreme Court turned to justification. 
The appellants argued inter alia that it was for the government to justify the discriminatory 
effect of excluding different-sex couples from the civil partnership regime, that strict scrutiny 
applied and that the measure must not merely be suitable to achieve a legitimate aim, it also 
needed to be necessary to exclude individuals of a specific sexual orientation from its remit. In 
response, counsel for the Secretary of State argued that any change to this sensitive area of 
social policy fell squarely within the remit of Parliament and that necessitated the conferral of 
a ‘significant measure of discretion’.18 Moreover, after the introduction of same-sex marriage, 
further research was needed to determine whether civil partnerships should be phased out or 
extended as ‘[m]omentous decisions of this type need…time for proper inquiry and 
consideration’.19  
 
                                                     
16 [2006] UKHL 11. For analysis see R. Wintemute, ‘Same-sex couples in Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions v M: identical to Karner and Godin-Mendoza, yet no discrimination?’ [2006] 6 EHRLR 722. 
17 See, for example, J.M v United Kingdom [2010] ECHR 1361 where the Strasbourg court effectively overruled 
the House of Lords in M. 
18 n 7 above, at [27] (Lord Kerr). 
19 ibid at [25] (Lord Kerr). 
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B - Area of Discretionary Judgment 
 
In relation to the need for a margin of appreciation to be afforded the government, the Supreme 
Court, citing the earlier House of Lords decision in Re G,20 remarked that such a concept does 
not exist domestically and, even if it did, in the form of a margin of discretion, it would be 
narrowly drawn since the dispute concerned a difference in treatment based on sexual 
orientation.21 Moreover, that concept was inapplicable since the government was aware that 
the effect of introducing same-sex marriage without simultaneous modification of the civil 
partnership scheme was the creation of inequality ‘where none had previously existed’.22 For 
the government to then ‘ask for the indulgence of time’ was, in the view of Lord Kerr, ‘less 
obviously deserving of a margin of discretion’.23  
 
B - Legitimate aim 
 
The Supreme Court adopted the four-part test, articulated by Lord Wilson in R (Aguilar Quila) 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department,24 which Lord Kerr summarised as follows: 
 
(a) is the legislative objective (legitimate aim) sufficiently important to justify limiting 
a fundamental right; (b) are the measures which have been designed to meet it rationally 
connected to it; (c) are they no more than are necessary to accomplish it; and (d) do 
                                                     
20 In re G (Adoption: Unmarried Couple) [2009] 1 AC 173. 
21 See M v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 2 AC 91 [153] (Lord Mance) discussed in Steinfeld n 
7 above, at [31]-[32] (Lord Kerr). 
22 n 7 above, at [36] (Lord Kerr). 
23 ibid. 
24 [2011] UKSC 45.  
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they strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the 
community?  
  
The request by the Secretary of State for further time to conduct research was deemed incapable 
of constituting a legitimate aim as it was not intrinsically linked to the discriminatory treatment. 
Put simply, it could ‘never amount to a legitimate aim for the continuance of the 
discrimination’.25 Had the government decided to phase out or extend civil partnerships upon 
the introduction of same-sex marriage, there would have been the potential to argue that the 
assembling of more data constituted a legitimate aim. But through creating ‘a new form of 
discrimination’26 and then asking for ‘tolerance’ such an argument was found to be 
unavailable.27 Even if there was a legitimate aim, less intrusive means were available to serve 
it. For example, whilst further research was being undertaken, the government could have 
delayed the commencement of same-sex marriage, extended civil partnerships to different-sex 
couples or, more controversially, paused all civil partnership registrations. As Lord Kerr noted, 
‘[e]ach of these options would have allowed the aim to be pursued with less, indeed no, 
discriminatory impact’.28 It was also clear that a fair balance was not struck between the rights 
of the individual and the interests of the community since objections by the community to 
denying different-sex couples access to civil partnerships for an ‘indefinite period’ and with an 
end still not in sight were ‘unspecified and not easy to envisage’.29  
 
                                                     
25 n 7 above, at [50] (Lord Kerr) (emphasis in original). 
26 ibid at [46] (Lord Kerr) (emphasis in original). 
27 ibid at [42] (Lord Kerr). 
28 ibid at [49]. 
29 Ibid at [52] (Lord Kerr). 
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The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the Secretary of State’s attempt to justify the 
differential treatment and issued a declaration that the relevant sections of the Civil Partnership 
Act 2004 precluding access to different-sex couples were incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 
of the ECHR. 
 
A - Data gathering and the use of public consultations 
 
As noted above, the Supreme Court hearing centred exclusively on justification since counsel 
for the Secretary of State had conceded after the High Court decision that maintaining civil 
partnerships for same-sex couples only was no longer a viable option and then, following the 
Court of Appeal decision, that the difference in treatment was potentially justifiable. These 
variations in the argument presented throughout the course of the litigation were highlighted 
by Lord Kerr. A key component of the government’s strategy rested upon the findings of 
consultations that in its view necessitated requesting more time to review the position after 
same-sex marriage had been introduced. These tactics found no favour in the Supreme Court 
and the arguments advanced as to their use were systematically dismantled. What is particularly 
striking about this aspect of the Court’s reasoning is its forthright nature and, in particular, the 
characterisation of the discriminatory treatment. Lord Kerr referred to the position as one that 
had created a ‘manifest inequality of treatment’30 but more problematic was the fact that the 
government knew that it was bringing about such state of affairs, leading him to find that it had 
approached the severity of the issue with ‘at best, an attitude of some insouciance’.31 He went 
on to state that he wished to make it ‘unequivocally clear’ that from the moment same-sex 
                                                     
30 ibid at [3]. 
31 ibid at [33]. 
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marriage introduced the government was placed under an obligation to eliminate the inequality 
of treatment immediately’ (emphasis in original).32 
 
It is thus apparent that the government’s appreciation of the human rights issues at stake was 
limited, despite the raising of the potential for infringement on multiple occasions. 
Commentators had noted several years before the Supreme Court ruling that a failure to phase 
out or extend civil partnerships upon the introduction of same-sex marriage could be deemed 
incompatible with the ECHR.33 The earlier ‘Equal Love’ case brought in 2011, comprising a 
claim for equal civil marriage, which ran in tandem with a claim for different-sex civil 
partnerships,  might also have provided such a warning (although the fact that it was ultimately 
declared inadmissible in December 2013, partly owing to the fact that one side of the case fell 
away following the introduction of same-sex marriage in March 2014, might have prompted 
the government to pay it little attention).34  
 
Section 15 of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, obliging the Secretary of State to 
issue a full public consultation on the future of civil partnerships, further evidenced limited 
appreciation of the ECHR dimension. In the ensuing review, the Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport stated, in one short paragraph, that even if a different-sex couple could bring the 
claim within the ambit of Article 8, the state is granted a margin of appreciation and, in light 
of the historical context, ‘it is not unlawful for same sex couples now to have more options 
available to them in terms of the legal recognition of their relationship than opposite sex 
                                                     
32 ibid at [50]. 
33 See Wintemute, n 10 above, and J.M. Scherpe and A. Hayward (eds), The Future of Registered Partnerships: 
Family Recognition beyond Marriage? (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017) vii. 
34 It was not in any event analogous with Steinfeld as both forms of couple had access to one formalized 
relationship status only. 
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couples’.35 The Supreme Court questioned this confident assumption and the belief that such 
inertia in this area would be ECHR-compliant. The central thrust of the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning was that this crucial appreciation of human rights had been side-lined and that the 
government’s consultation strategy had been initiated in a manner ‘unconnected with the 
government’s perceptions of its obligations under ECHR’.36  
 
The use of consultations was also criticised from a different direction. It should be noted here 
that the government was undoubtedly placed in a difficult position since while any consultation 
exercise needed to be completed swiftly, particularly as this discrimination affected ‘one of the 
closest relationships which one adult has with another’, time was needed to ensure that a 
reliable dataset was generated.37 As the 2014 consultation was completed shortly after the 
introduction of same-sex marriage in March that year, it is hardly surprising that the data on 
civil partnership uptake would be inconclusive. Nevertheless, the significance of the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Steinfeld was not necessarily related to the speed with which this exercise 
was conducted, but instead related to the focus of these consultations.38 For instance, Lord Kerr 
stated that interviewing current same-sex civil partners to better understand their views on civil 
partnership and marriage was ‘at best, of dubious relevance to the question of whether the 
continuing discrimination against different sex couples can be defended’.39 Here, the Court 
                                                     
35 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, n 5 above, 15. 
36 n 7 above, at [34] (Lord Kerr). 
37 n 13 above, at [110] (Arden LJ). 
38 Note also the timing of publications; the Command Paper, The Future Operation of Civil Partnership: 
Gathering Further Information, Cm 9606 (2018) was released two working days before the Supreme Court 
hearing in Steinfeld on the 14 May 2018. 
39 n 7 above, at [53]. 
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echoed views expressed by academics that the methodology of the consultation in 2014 lacked 
precision and failed to ask the right questions.40  
 
It should be recognised, however, that both the Equal Civil Marriage consultation41 and the 
later Department for Culture, Media and Sport consultation did seek views on whether civil 
partnerships should be extended to different-sex couples but received differing results.42 The 
former saw 61 per cent of respondents, amounting to around 214,000 individual responses, 
favour opening up civil partnerships to different-sex couples,43 whereas the latter consultation 
saw a decrease to 22 per cent, albeit out of a much smaller cohort of 10,634 respondents.44 But, 
crucially, the significance of Steinfeld on this particular point is that Lord Kerr was clearly of 
the opinion that emphasising the same-sex dimension failed to address adequately, and had no 
causal connection to, the central point of the dispute at hand: discrimination against different-
sex couples.  
 
A - Issuing a Declaration of Incompatibility 
 
Steinfeld and Keidan remain unable to register a civil partnership. That result could have been 
avoided had the Court used the interpretative obligation in section 3 of the Human Rights Act 
                                                     
40 See A. Hayward, ‘Justifiable Discrimination – The Case of Opposite-Sex Civil Partnerships’ (2017) 76 CLJ 
243, 245-246 and A. Hayward, ‘The Future of Civil Partnerships in England and Wales’ in Scherpe and Hayward, 
n 32 above, 527, 549-550.  
41 Government Equalities Office, n 5 above. 
42 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, n 5 above.  
43 HM Government, Equal Marriage: The Government’s Response (London: 2012) 42. 
44 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales): Report on 
Conclusions (London: 2014) 11. However, note the contradictory results in this consultation as whilst the majority 
of respondents were against the extension of civil partnerships to different-sex couples, a majority (55%) were 
equally against the scheme being phased out for same-sex couples.  
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1998 to reinterpret sections 1 and 3 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 to render them compatible 
with Articles 8 and 14. In light of the complexity involved in such a move, and since counsel 
for the litigants actively sought a declaration, it is unsurprising that this point was not canvassed 
by the Court, and thus the remedial potential of section 3 as the ‘linchpin’, in the sense of 
incorporating the rights of the Convention domestically, was not further explored.45 Had such 
point been argued, it is likely that the same-sex requirement of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 
would be regarded by the Court as a ‘fundamental feature’ of the legislative scheme, thereby 
necessitating judicial restraint.46  
 
Turning to section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and institutional competence, Lord Kerr 
travelled the typical constitutional law terrain surrounding the making of declarations, noting 
the government’s argument that any change ‘fell squarely within the field of sensitive social 
policy which the democratically-elected legislature was pre-eminently suited to make’.47 But, 
having established that the government’s measure pursued no legitimate aim, he found that 
such a view was unpersuasive. This robust dismissal of a call for deference, coupled with the 
fact that a declaration was ultimately issued, is of particular modern significance in that it 
opposes a recent trend whereby courts refuse to declare provisions incompatible, as 
exemplified in R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice48 and, more recently, in a case concerning 
abortion in Northern Ireland.49 
                                                     
45 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30 at [46] (Lord Steyn). See A. Kavanagh, ‘Judicial Restraint in the 
Pursuit of Justice’ [2010] 60 UTLJ 23, 31-32 and discussion of this option in Fenwick and Hayward, n 2 above, 
113-114. 
46 ibid at [33] (Lord Nicholls).  
47 n 7 above, at [54]. 
48 R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38. 
49 In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review 
(Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 27. Note, however, the willingness of the Supreme Court to declare provisions 
relating to abortion incompatible but that these views were obiter as a majority of the Court found that the 
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Thus, a closer examination of this potential reversal of the trend is required. Citing his own 
minority view (albeit unattributed) in Nicklinson, Lord Kerr’s analysis emphasised the 
established principle that declarations do not affect the continuing validity of the provision 
concerned or compel action on the part of the government or Parliament. He further stressed 
that the conditional phrasing of section 4(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998, whereby the court 
may issue a declaration, clearly envisages instances where incompatibility may exist, but no 
corresponding declaration is issued. However, he noted that instances of such reticence have 
not been ‘comprehensively catalogued’.50 This all might appear to suggest that there is some 
recent acceptance of a somewhat limited role for declarations; yet that observation must be 
contrasted with Lord Kerr’s bold conclusion in Steinfeld that the Court has ‘been given the 
power under section 4 of HRA…and that, in the circumstances of this case, it would be wrong 
not to have recourse to that power’ (emphasis added).51 
 
So, what are the circumstances creating a particular sense of urgency which had an impact on 
the decision to issue a declaration and which imbued its wording with that sense in Steinfeld? 
First, the absence of a legitimate aim and the comprehensive, unanimous rejection of the 
government’s arguments may have contributed towards a desire on the part of the Court to 
compel action whilst, at the same time, being fully cognisant of the limitations of a declaration. 
It was the most unequivocal message the Supreme Court could send, particularly as this was 
not an instance of inequality created through omission or oversight, but one brought about 
                                                     
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission lacked standing: see J. Rooney, ‘Standing and the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission’ (2019) 82(3) MLR 525. 
50 n 7 above, at [57] (Lord Kerr). 
51 ibid at [61]. 
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deliberately through a desire by the government to secure same-sex marriage at all costs.52 
Second, and drawing an analogy with Nicklinson,53 the fact that Parliamentary time had been 
expended on Tim Loughton MP’s Private Member’s Bill could have militated towards 
reticence in issuing a declaration, despite a finding of discrimination.54 However, the fact that 
this path was not chosen may reveal the Supreme Court’s misgivings about that process; 
indeed, Lady Hale stated, extra-judicially, that she had been ‘rather hoping that Parliament 
would solve matters for us’.55 Despite Lord Kerr noting that ongoing Parliamentary 
consideration was no ‘inevitable contraindication to a declaration of incompatibility’, it is 
arguable that a declaration was issued since the Court knew that, as a Private Member’s Bill, it 
had limited chances of success56 and, at that time, it had been watered down merely to compel 
a review, as opposed to an textual amendment of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, as originally 
planned. Third, the Supreme Court was clearly mindful of the fact that there was at the time of 
the hearing no indication of an end point in sight in terms of the removal of the asymmetry of 
access to civil partnerships.57 This aspect generated additional uncertainty for both current civil 
partners and those wishing to enter one in the future. 
 
The use of a declaration in Steinfeld, as opposed to a potentially strained use of the section 3 
interpretative obligation, will invariably appeal to political constitutionalists desirous of 
                                                     
52 See observations to this effect by Alistair Carmichael MP: HC Public Bill Committee col 12 18 July 2018. 
53 In this case the Assisted Dying Bill [HL] 2014-2015. 
54 The Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration Etc.) Bill 2017–19. 
55 B. Hale, ‘Private Family Law Reform’ [2018] Family Law 810, 814. 
56 See A. Brazier and R. Fox, ‘Enhancing the Backbench MP ’s Role as a Legislator: The Case for Urgent Reform 
of Private Members’ Bills’ (2010) 63 Parliamentary Affairs 201. 
57 See H. Fenwick and A. Hayward, ‘Rejecting asymmetry of access to formal relationship statuses for same and 
different-sex couples at Strasbourg and domestically’ [2017] 6 EHRLR 544. 
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political processes to motivate reform rather than placing reliance on the judges.58 However, 
despite Lord Kerr’s standard emphasis placed on the merely declaratory element of section 4, 
this was no ordinary issuance of a declaration. The succinct, unanimous and unequivocal nature 
of the judgment in Steinfeld was the closest the Court could, realistically, get to compelling 
action.59 
 
A - The impact of Steinfeld on civil partnership reform 
 
Below, the significance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Steinfeld will be assessed through 
evaluating its impact on the government’s on-going review of civil partnerships. The Supreme 
Court expressed no clear preference as to the ultimate fate of this regime. This position perhaps 
echoes the desire, previously expressed by the Court of Appeal, of judges not to ‘micro-manage 
areas of social and economic policy’ and certainly, again, reinforces the fundamental nature of 
a declaration of incompatibility.60 However, one possible indication of support for extension 
of the regime was an extra-judicial observation made by Lady Hale when, in April 2018, she 
remarked that the aim of the Equal Civil Partnerships campaign was to ‘strengthen rather than 
to undermine family responsibility’, later asking: ‘[s]houldn’t we actually welcome couples 
who want to enter into a legal commitment to one another, whatever it is?’.61 But these 
observations were then followed up, unsurprisingly in light of Lady Hale’s involvement in the 
                                                     
58 See T. Hickman, ‘Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2005] 
Public Law 306. 
59 Contrast this with the arguably stronger remedy of disapplying a provision under European Union law as seen 
in Walker v Innospec Limited and others [2017] UKSC 47 where the Supreme Court adopted such an approach 
after finding that paragraph 18 of Schedule 9 to the Equality Act 2010 was incompatible with the Framework 
Directive.  
60 n 13 above, at [162] (Beatson LJ). 
61 Hale, n 55 above, 814. 
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then pending appeal, by the comment that ‘[t]here is (almost) always more than one solution 
to unjustified discrimination on suspect grounds - one can level up or level down’.62 
Nevertheless, the unambiguous call for action sent by the Supreme Court leaves no room for 
misinterpretation, and it is important to emphasise that no government since the inception of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 has refused to respond to a declaration of incompatibility.63 That 
response, culminating in the Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration etc) Act 
2019, will be analysed further below. 
 
Evidence of movement on the part of the government was present soon after Steinfeld was 
handed down. The litigants immediately called upon Penny Mordaunt MP, Minister for 
Women and Equalities, to either back Tim Loughton MP’s Private Member’s Bill or use the 
power contained in section 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to take ‘fast-track’ remedial 
action to remove the incompatibility. Similarly, on the morning the outcome in Steinfeld was 
announced, Tim Loughton MP asked Prime Minister Theresa May whether she would support 
his Private Member’s Bill. In response, May stated that the judgment would be considered with 
‘great care’ and that the government was supporting his Bill insofar as it compels a ‘full review 
of the operation of civil partnerships’.64 In the Committee Stage of the Loughton Bill, held on 
the 18th July 2018, it was reported that Mordaunt had instructed that the period of time for 
conducting research was to be reduced ‘with a view to concluding it later this year’.65  
                                                     
62 ibid. 
63 See Ministry of Justice, n 9 above. Note, however, the issues surrounding prisoner voting rights, analysed in C. 
Murray, ‘We Need to Talk: “Democratic Dialogue” and the Ongoing Saga of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ [2011] 
62 NILQ 57.  
64 Prime Minister’s Questions vol 643 col 896-897 27 June 2018. 
65 HC Public Bill Committee col 15 18 July 2018. It should be noted that her predecessor Justine Greening MP 
had in a 10-page confidential document, Options for Extending Civil Partnerships to Opposite-Sex Couples 
proposed their extension but plans were shelved in January 2018 following her resignation: The Guardian, ‘Plan 
to extend civil partnerships revealed in government report’ (13 May 2018).  
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More recently, Prime Minister Theresa May’s announcement in October 2018 that different-
sex civil partnerships will be introduced now offers a clearer indication of the future reform 
trajectory. In announcing the move, it was stated that reform would ‘protect the interests of 
opposite-sex couples who want to commit, want to formalise their relationship but don’t 
necessarily want to get married’ and would ensure that ‘all couples, be they same-sex or 
opposite-sex, are given the same choices in life’.66 This policy announcement is significant for 
several reasons and requires careful consideration.  
 
First, the announcement avoids engagement with one method of removing the compatibility 
identified in Steinfeld; namely, phasing out the civil partnership regime.67 This approach, the 
so-called Nordic Model, has been adopted in several jurisdictions and is often premised on the 
idea that civil partnerships were initially introduced for same-sex couples as a precursor to 
opening up marriage and once marriage is introduced their purpose becomes redundant.68 It 
can be contrasted with the Dutch Model, where the civil partnership scheme is retained 
following the introduction of same-sex marriage as its foundational purpose – as an alternative 
to, and not a replacement for, marriage – continues.69  
                                                     
66 Evening Standard, ‘Straight couples to be allowed to enter civil partnerships, Theresa May reveals’ (2 October 
2018). 
67 K. Waaldijk, ‘Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands’ in R. 
Wintemute and M. Andenaes (eds), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European 
and International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) and J.M. Scherpe, ‘The Past, Present and Future of 
Registered Partnerships’ in Scherpe and Hayward, n 32 above. 
68 Several jurisdictions originally introduced same-sex registered partnerships but phased them out following the 
subsequent introduction of same-sex marriage: Denmark (1989), Norway (1993), Iceland (1996), Germany 
(2001), Finland (2002), Ireland (2010). 
69 See The Netherlands, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Malta where this pattern emerged. Simultaneous 
introduction of same-sex marriage and extension of civil partnerships to different-sex couples took place in the 
Isle of Man in 2016. 
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The Prime Minister’s statement is a welcome move as phasing out the regime in England and 
Wales would have been controversial as it would have created a ‘legacy status’ and 
marginalised same-sex couples who may, like the litigants in Steinfeld, also hold strong 
ideological objections to marriage.70 Indeed, LGBT activist groups, such as Stonewall71 and 
the Peter Tatchell Foundation, both oppose phasing out the civil partnership regime, the latter 
believing that such a move would ‘provoke an almighty backlash’ and ‘do catastrophic damage 
to relations between the Conservative party and LGBT people’.72 Moreover, it is argued that 
since the introduction of same-sex marriage a unique context was created that militated towards 
extension of the regime. This is particularly the case as, since March 2014, same-sex couples 
have continued to register civil partnerships, in full awareness of the availability of an 
alternative option (marriage), and it is estimated that only 12 per cent of current civil partners 
have actually chosen to convert their partnership to marriage.73 Taking cognisance of the 
potential detriment to same-sex couples, extension of the regime to different-sex couples would 
now give expression to a unique evolution of the institution of civil partnership, exclusive to 
this jurisdiction, and also would accord greater respect to the values underlying Article 8.74 
 
Second, the Prime Minister’s announcement responds to growing enthusiasm for reform, and 
the publicity generated by the Supreme Court ruling will have undoubtedly contributed to 
                                                     
70 On the detrimental impact to same-sex couples, see Fenwick and Hayward, n 2 above. 
71 Stonewall, ‘Abolishing civil partnerships is not an option’, 27 June 2018 at https://www.stonewall.org.uk/our-
work/blog/abolishing-civil-partnerships-not-option (last accessed 3 May 2019). 
72 Equal Civil Partnerships Campaign, ‘Campaign responds to reports of Government u-turn on civil partnerships 
for opposite-sex couples’, 1 February 2018 at http://equalcivilpartnerships.org.uk/2018/02/campaign-responds-
reports-government-u-turn-civil-partnerships-opposite-sex-couples/ (last accessed 3 May 2019). 
73 HC Public Bill Committee col 21 18 July 2018 (Tim Loughton MP). 
74 See Fenwick and Hayward, n 2 above, 118-119. See also B. Douglas, ‘Too Attentive to our Duty: The 
Fundamental Conflict Underlying Human Rights Protection in the UK’ (2018) 38(3) Legal Studies 360. 
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galvanising public support, as evidenced by an increase in signatures to the Change.org 
petition, Open Civil Partnerships to All, immediately following Steinfeld being handed down.75 
More importantly, the existence of a Supreme Court judgment now places England and Wales 
in a different position to that of other European jurisdictions that phased out civil partnership 
regimes at the same time as introducing same-sex marriage (and with little controversy, 
opposition or litigation). It is thus likely that the government knew that the presence of such a 
judgment would make it difficult, in a political sense, to phase out civil partnerships. Indeed, 
even prior to the Prime Minister’s announcement, Baroness Deech speculated that Steinfeld 
now makes it ‘highly likely that we will soon be legislating for civil partnerships for 
heterosexual couples’.76 
 
Third, the commitment to introduce different-sex civil partnerships has now been placed on a 
statutory footing through the Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration etc) Act 
2019 that enters force on the 26th May 2019. Section 2 of that Act enables the Secretary of 
State to amend the Civil Partnership Act 2004 via regulations so that two persons who are not 
of the same sex become eligible to form a civil partnership in England and Wales. This power 
must be exercised so that regulations are in force by the 31st December 2019.77 Whilst the 
purpose of this section is laudable, the drafting is troubling as the Act defers heavily to the 
Secretary of State through the sanctioning of extensive Henry VIII powers, many of which are 
uncertain in terms of their precise scope.78 For example, alongside the duty to create these 
                                                     
75 Currently standing at 148,000 signatures in May 2019. See https://www.change.org/p/minister-for-women-and-
equalities-penny-mordaunt-mp-open-civil-partnerships-to-all (last accessed 3 May 2019).  
76 HL Deb vol 792 col 1404 20 July 2018. 
77 The Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration Etc.) Act 2019, s 2(2).  
78 The inclusion of these powers has generated criticism: see The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform 
Committee 45th Report of Session 2017-19 (HL Paper 274) (29 January 2019) noting that the justification for the 
Henry VIII powers was ‘wholly lacking in this case’. 
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regulations, section 2(3) empowers the Secretary of State to make any other provision deemed 
appropriate in view of the extension of eligibility criteria to form civil partnerships. Similarly, 
and in relation to conversion of pre-existing civil partnerships to marriage, the Secretary of 
State must consult such persons as they consider appropriate prior to the introduction of 
regulations. It is thus evidently clear that extension of the regime through this route may not 
necessarily be a straightforward or transparent process. In hindsight, production of a 
comprehensive Bill that could have been debated fully, and in accordance with stringent 
Parliamentary procedures, would have been more advantageous than supporting this Bill that 
during this Parliamentary sitting alone had key clauses changed on no less than four occasions.  
 
Without the benefit of the regulations, the text of the Act envisages that civil partnership 
eligibility under the extended regime would encompass intimate, conjugal couples that are 
currently excluded on the basis of sex. This would ensure that siblings would continue to be 
excluded. However, there are areas that still need clarification. For example, section 2 only 
applies to England and Wales and thus the regulations must engage with the fact that marriage 
and civil partnership remain devolved matters for Scotland and Northern Ireland. Close 
attention will need to be paid to complex private international law issues such as recognition 
of a different-sex civil partnership registered overseas.79 In addition, the regulations will need 
to grapple with the financial consequences of civil partnerships and child law matters such as 
parenthood, parental responsibility and the pater est presumption. Thankfully, following the 
Government’s recent announcement of plans to introduce a No Fault Divorce Bill, it is now 
likely that any consideration of adultery as a basis for dissolution applying to different-sex civil 
partners will not take place and that the proposed notification system would apply equally to 
                                                     
79 See M. Ní Shúilleabháin, ‘Private international law implications of “equal civil partnerships”’ [2019] 68(1) 
ICLQ 161. 
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spouses and civil partners.80 Overall, although further work is required, it should ultimately be 
remembered that tiered systems of equal marriage and civil partnership operate effectively in 
other jurisdictions and, subject to the drafting of the regulations, potential clearly exists for 
such a system to operate effectively in England and Wales.81  
 
A - Conclusion 
 
The result in Steinfeld was not entirely surprising and it was anticipated by academics that a 
declaration would ultimately be issued.82 What was surprising, however, was the forceful 
clarity and unambiguous message sent by the Supreme Court to the government. The judgment 
was, as noted by Tim Loughton MP, ‘absolutely categorical’ as to the need for action to be 
taken.83 Thus, through the Supreme Court emphasising the patently anomalous and 
discriminatory position of England and Wales, the judgment in Steinfeld was able to exert 
pressure upon the government to reform this area and, as a result, lay the foundations for the 
forthcoming introduction of equal civil partnerships. As for the Supreme Court’s discussion of 
institutional competence and the decision to issue a declaration of incompatibility, the 
influence of Steinfeld will also extend outside the realm of family law. In time, the judgment 
is very likely to become a salutary lesson for future governments contemplating the creation of 
situations of difference in legal treatment on protected grounds and then seeking the indulgence 
of time as a means of justification.  
                                                     
80 Ministry of Justice, Reducing family conflict Government response to the consultation on reform of the legal 
requirements for divorce, CP 58 April 2019. 
81 See, for example, the regimes operating in The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Australia and New Zealand.  
82 See S. Halliday, ‘Civil partnerships, human rights, constitutionalism and the UK Supreme Court’ [2018] Family 
Law 608. 
83 HC Public Bill Committee col 11 18 July 2018. 
